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ABSTRACT 
The dialogical principle is central not just to Humboldt’s theory of language but also to his 
philosophical anthropology, and it has a direct political relevance. Dialogue is intrinsic to the 
realization of human subjectivity in a diverse community of free individuals. Language involves two 
constitutive principles: the inner linguistic sense (‘innerer Sprachsinn’) and objective sound (‘der 
Laut’): individual self-expression has meaning only when it is reflected back in the voice of another. 
The diversity (‘Verschiedenheit’) of languages and their comparative study is not just essential to our 
understanding of our own languages as well as those of others; it is intrinsic to the nature of language 
as such. Translation is thus a privileged route to cultural as well as linguistic communication. 
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A VAST ARRAY OF THINKERS since classical antiquity have seen dialogue as intrinsic to the 
pursuit of truth, and used the dialogic form as the philosophical or literary mode most 
appropriate to the articulation of their thought. From Plato to David Hume and modern 
thinkers like Derrida and Žižek, philosophers have used dialogue as a vehicle of dialectic, in 
which truth is supposed to emerge from the clash and mutual interaction of intellectual 
perspectives. The German Romantics, concerned especially with the difficulty and therefore 
the irony involved in the articulation of the inner self, turned to dialogue as an instrument of 
both literary and philosophical communication. Nineteenth-century social and psychological 
critics of religion like Ludwig Feuerbach and his literary disciple George Eliot saw in 
dialogue – the connection of I to Thou and the realization of both in community – the real 
social presence of the truth which religion had once expressed in theological form. In the 
twentieth century the great Jewish philosopher Martin Buber – himself indebted to 
Humboldt
1
 – sees in the ‘I–Thou’ relation the key to understanding both man’s relationship to 
God and the social ethic which that relationship engenders. The literary critic Mikhail 
Bakhtin proposed with his concept of the ‘dialogic’ (heteroglossia) a radically new way of 
reading literary texts, whilst the contemporary concern with globalization and the cultural 
hybridity that process has produced makes intercultural dialogue an urgent political necessity.  
What, then, is special about Humboldt’s idea of the dialogical character of truth? What most 
distinguishes Humboldt’s approach to dialogue is, firstly, his idea of the original (in both 
senses) character of dialogue in relation to both language and thought and, secondly, the 
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centrality of that idea to his entire political and cultural vision of the realization of human 
freedom.  
For Humboldt, dialogue is primary to language in two senses. First, language does not 
‘employ’ dialogue; it is itself intrinsically dialogical. In particular, our sense of selfhood is 
inseparable from our ability to address a ‘Thou’. Human self-consciousness and therefore our 
consciousness of an encompassing human world are irreducibly both linguistic and 
dialogical. Secondly, language as dialogue cannot be conceived as having a natural or 
supernatural origin apart from the emergence of humanity itself. Language – dialogue – is 
coextensive with the sphere of the human. For Humboldt, the original dialogical character of 
language is related to both the way we learn languages and the way languages develop among 
a plurality (Verschiedenheit) of different tongues. The development of a speaker to linguistic 
maturity and the evolution of a linguistic community towards an ever more adequate means 
of human expression necessarily imply an engagement with difference. For Humboldt, this is 
the model and paradigm of humanity itself. The most important theme in Humboldt’s 
political philosophy is the realization of individual freedom in a community of free persons. 
In his essay on the necessary limitation of the power of the state (Versuch, die Gränzen der 
Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen, 1797), he argues that the object of the political state is 
to enable the realization of human freedom, but neither to initiate nor to preclude its 
expression. That realization can come about only by the encounter of freedom with 
difference, which takes place as we learn language and, with a similar dynamic, as we learn 
to live together in a human community.
2
 It implies Freiheit, the creative freedom with which 
each person apprehends both language and humanity, Mannigfaltigkeit, the manifold variety 
of linguistic and human environments they encounter, and Eigentümlichkeit, the mature 
human personality, with its own unique mode of participation in a common world of human 
meaning, which is the upshot of that encounter.
3
  
Humboldt’s clearest and most fundamental expression of the dialogical principle 
comes in his essay on dualism in language Über den Dualis (‘On the Dual’) published in 
1827. Our very idea of an independent self – what Martin Buber was later to call ‘die 
Ablösung des Ich’ [the detachment of the I]4 – is inconceivable without our capacity to 
address another, which is also the source of our ability to conceive of a world
5
 of concepts 
and not only of perceptions:  
 
Es liegt aber in dem ursprünglichen Wesen der Sprache ein unabänderlicher Dualismus [...]; 
schon das Denken ist wesentlich von einer Neigung zum gesellschaftlichen Daseyn begleitet, 
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und der Mensch sehnt sich, abgesehen von allen körperlichen und Empfindungsbeziehungen, 
auch zum Behuf seines blossen Denkens nach einem dem Ich entsprechenden Du, der Begriff 
scheint ihm erst seine Bestimmtheit und Gewissheit durch das Zurückstrahlen einer fremden 
Denkkraft zu erreichen. (GS VI: 26) 
 
[At the very root of language lies an irreversible dualism […]; thought itself is always 
accompanied by a tendency towards social existence. Quite apart from his or her physical or 
emotional relationships, the human person strives for the sake of thinking itself towards a 
‘Thou’ which corresponds to the ‘I’. Concepts become precise and certain for us only when 
they are reflected back to us through the thinking of another person.]
6
 
  
Humboldt’s emphasis on the social and dialogical character of language is a direct 
consequence of his understanding that words are not discrete ‘signs’ representing objects 
external to themselves:  
 
Es bleibt zwischen dem Wort und seinem Gegenstande eine so befremdende Kluft, das Wort 
gleicht, allein im Einzelnen geboren, so sehr einem blossen Scheinobject, die Sprache kann 
auch nicht vom Einzelnen, sie kann nur gesellschaftlich, nur indem an einen gewagten 
Versuch ein neuer sich anknüpft, zur Wirklichkeit gebracht werden. Das Wort muß also 
Wesenheit, die Sprache Erweiterung in einem Fremden und Erwiedernden gewinnen. (GS VI: 
26) 
 
[There is always such an alienating rift between the word and object, the word, as it is born in 
the consciousness of a single individual, seems to be such an illusory object, that language 
cannot be realized by any one individual, but only in society; that is when one person’s 
tentative attempt at linguistic expression is matched by the response of another. The essence 
of the word is realized, and language can develop, only through one who hears and replies.]  
 
Humboldt’s perception that what we call the world of human experience is constructed by, 
even if it cannot be reduced to, the multiple systems of human language does not lead him to 
the conclusion that communication between languages is impossible or that the idea of a 
universal human truth is incoherent. Quite the reverse: the primacy of language to thought 
and its intrinsically dialogical character are the source of the objective connection between 
language and truth. 
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As Humboldt writes in his essay Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen 
Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts [‘The 
Diversity of Human Language-Structure and its Influence on the Mental Development of 
Mankind’, 1830], all actual language has two ‘constitutive principles’ (‘constitutive 
Principe’) (GS VII: 251). They are the inner linguistic sense (‘innerer Sprachsinn’), which 
Humboldt identifies with our whole intellectual faculty of forming and using language (‘das 
ganze geistige Vermögen, bezogen auf die Bildung und den Gebrauch der Sprache’), and the 
objective form of language in the spoken sound (‘Der Laut’). The relationship between the 
two principles is dialectical, because the speaker only understands what she is saying when 
she hears her own speech reflected back to her in the words of an interlocutor. Dialogue, in 
other words, is essential not just to the establishment of an objective world of human 
discourse, but to the apprehension of human subjectivity itself (GS VII: 55–56).  
This is the source of what Jürgen Trabant has called ‘the constitutive strangeness of 
language’ (‘die konstitutive Fremdheit der Sprache’).7 Humboldt differs from 
deconstructionists like Derrida in seeing linguistic alienation as already present in speech.
8
 In 
speech (as in all linguistic usage) we experience not only the utterances of others but also our 
own as ‘strange’, because they are reflected in the objective world of human discourse. We 
can never, at any given moment, reduce that world to a discrete object of the mind, but only 
participate in and so creatively extend it. We can speak ‘about’ that world only as, and 
because, we speak in and of it. To be sure, in language we encounter the humanity (‘die 
Menschheit’) of which we are always a part. However, our humanity will necessarily appear 
to us as strange, because what we have ourselves created is reflected back to us as something 
other than ourselves. Humboldt’s insight, which is about humanity as much as about 
language, is that this strangeness is ultimately benign, because it is a necessary moment in the 
process of our becoming persons and so changing our environment into a human world.
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Our participation in language, for Humboldt, is about the self-alienation of humanity and its 
overcoming. To be human is to live in language. To live in language is to encounter a world 
which is strange to ourselves, in a way which is different in degree, but not in kind, when we 
encounter other languages as well as our own. For this reason, Humboldt writes, all 
understanding is also a form of non-understanding (GS VII: 64).  
Language is by the same token both individual and social. The social character of 
language does not suppress or distort its capacity for individual expression, but rather makes 
it possible:  
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Erst im Individuum erhält die Sprache ihre letzte Bestimmtheit. Keiner denkt bei dem Wort 
gerade und genau das, was der andre, und die noch so kleine Verschiedenheit zittert, wie ein 
Kreis im Wasser, durch die ganze Sprache fort. (GS VII: 64) 
 
[Only in the individual does language receive its ultimate determinacy. Nobody means by a 
word precisely and exactly what his neighbour does, and the difference, be it ever so small, 
vibrates, like a ripple in water, throughout the entire language.]
10
  
 
Humboldt writes in his essay Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die 
verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwickung [‘On the Comparative Study of Language in 
Relation to the Different Stages of Language Development’, 1820] that the phenomenon of 
language implies not only a plurality of speakers but also a plurality of worlds of speech 
which are also worlds of thought:  
 
Das Denken ist aber nicht bloss abhängig von der Sprache überhaupt, sondern, bis auf einen 
gewissen Grad, auch von jeder einzelnen bestimmten. (GS IV: 21)  
 
[Thought is not only dependent on language as such but also, to a certain degree, on each 
particular language.] 
 
However, most central to Humboldt’s argument is not the relativity of thought to language 
and therefore the contingent plurality of linguistic and intellectual perspectives, but the 
universal human need for diversity which that plurality implies. In his essay Einleitung in das 
gesammte Sprachstudium [‘Introduction to the Whole Study of Language’, 1810/11], 
Humboldt writes as follows: 
 
Vermutlich ist der eigentliche Grund der Vielheit der Sprachen das innere Bedürfnis des 
menschlichen Geistes, eine Mannigfaltigkeit intellectueller Formen hervorzubringen, welche 
Schranke auf uns gleich unbekannte Weise, als die Mannigfaltigkeit der belebten 
Naturbildungen, findet. (GS VII/2: 622) 
 
[The real reason for the multiplicity of languages is probably the inner need of the human 
mind to bring forth a multiplicity of intellectual forms. The limit to that diversity is as 
incomprehensible to us as the limit to the formation of organisms in the natural world.] 
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Just as the individual speaker can realize her own linguistic and intellectual personality only 
through the act of dialogue, languages themselves can develop only through linguistic 
encounter (GS VII: 19). For this reason the diversity (Verschiedenheit) of languages, which is 
inescapably connected to the diversity of modes of human thought, is not only a contingent 
fact, nor a hindrance to universal communication. On the contrary, it is the condition of the 
possibility of such communication and the purpose of the reflective study of language. For 
Humboldt, the study of language must necessarily be comparative, because the encounter 
between languages is the key to linguistic development. However, just as our quest for 
interpersonal understanding within a given linguistic community can never be definitively 
realized, so we can approach the comparative study of language only as a regulative ideal. 
Thus Humboldt writes in his essay Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium of 1820 as 
follows:   
 
Hierin ist der Grund, und der letzte Zweck aller Sprachuntersuchung enthalten. Die Summe 
des Erkennbaren liegt, als das von dem menschlichen Geiste zu bearbeitende Feld, zwischen 
allen Sprachen, und unabhängig von ihnen, in der Mitte; der Mensch kann sich diesem rein 
objectiven Gebiet nicht anders, als nach seiner Erkennungs- und Empfindungsweise, also auf 
einem subjectiven Wege, nähern. (GS IV: 27) 
 
[This is the ground and the ultimate purpose of all our investigation of language. The totality 
of what can be known, as our field of intellectual enquiry, lies between all languages, and 
independent of any particular language, in the middle. We can only approach this purely 
objective domain by means of our faculty of knowledge and imagination; that is to say, 
subjectively.]  
 
In language, especially the encounter between languages, the relationship between the 
transcendental freedom and the actual embodiment of humanity becomes manifest, but 
remains always partially impenetrable to the reflective mind. Our study of language 
necessarily involves the subjective imagination because the object of our concern is the 
subjectivity of humanity itself, which is expressed by, but can never be reduced to, the means 
of its linguistic expression (GS IV: 27). 
For the same reason, translation is essential to Humboldt’s idea of the comparative 
study of language. For Humboldt, the object of translation is to overcome not what is ‘other’ 
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(‘das Fremde’) in the target language and text but rather what is ‘alien’ (‘die Fremdheit’) in 
it.
11
 In a famous introduction to a translation of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, he writes as follows:  
 
Solange nicht die Fremdheit, sondern das Fremde gefühlt wird, hat die Übersetzung ihre 
höchsten Zwecke erreicht; wo aber die Fremdheit an sich erscheint, und vielleicht das Fremde 
verdunkelt, da verräth der Übersetzer, daβ er seinem Original nicht gewachsen ist. (GS VIII: 
132) 
 
[As long as what we feel on reading a translation is not the alien quality (‘die Fremdheit’), but 
what is other (‘das Fremde’) about the original, translation has fulfilled its true purpose. 
However, if only the alien is apparent and what is other is obscured, it is clear that the 
translation is not adequate to the original.] 
 
The object of translation is not to overcome, but to disclose the meaning of linguistic 
difference. Its purpose is not simply to understand foreign languages and literatures, but 
chiefly to extend our knowledge of our own (GS VIII: 130). 
Our encounter with the strangeness of a foreign language is therefore a privileged 
route to understanding the strangeness – the necessarily objective and contingently alien 
character – of all language, including especially our own. Such understanding, for Humboldt, 
is never to be confused with exhaustive or reductive explanation. For Humboldt, the 
phenomenon of language implies a kind of mysterious creativity which belongs to the 
immediate embodiment of the inner linguistic sense, unique to each individual and yet 
connected to one or more communities of speech, in the external medium of sound:  
 
Die unzertrennliche Verbindung des Gedankens, des Stimmwerkzeugs und des Gehörs zur 
Sprache liegt unabänderlich in der ursprünglichen, nicht weiter zu erklärenden Einrichtung 
der menschlichen Natur. (GS VII: 53) 
 
The inseparable bonding of thought, vocal apparatus, and hearing to language is unalterably 
rooted in the original constitution of human nature, which cannot be further explained. (PH 
55) 
 
This irreducible element of creative spontaneity in language is of general human relevance. It 
points to the creative freedom inherent in all human moral and imaginative life: a freedom 
which is real precisely because it can never be abstracted from the objective means of its 
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expression. Language points to the truth, crucial to Humboldt’s moral and political as well as 
his linguistic philosophy, that it is only through our experience of the constraint (Einengung) 
of membership in particular human communities, indeed their distinctive difference 
(Ausschliessung) one from another, that mature personality (Eigentümlichkeit) can emerge 
(GS VII: 24–25).  
The purpose of learning new languages is therefore not just more adequately to 
understand other languages or one’s own, but to approach (though never definitively to 
achieve) the understanding of human creativity itself:  
 
Die Erlernung einer fremden Sprache sollte daher die Gewinnung eines neuen Standpunkts in 
der bisherigen Weltansicht seyn und ist es in der That bis auf einen gewissen Grad, da jede 
Sprache das ganze Gewebe der Begriffe und die Vorstellungsweise eines Theils der 
Menschheit enthält. Nur weil man in eine fremde Sprache immer, mehr oder weniger, seine 
eigne Welt, ja seine eigne Sprachansicht hinüberträgt, so wird dieser Erfolg nicht rein und 
vollständig empfunden. (GS VII: 60) 
 
[To learn a foreign language should therefore be to acquire a new standpoint in the world-
view hitherto possessed, and in fact to a certain extent is so, since every language contains the 
whole conceptual fabric and mode of presentation of a portion of mankind. But because we 
always carry over, more or less, our own worldview, and even our own language-view, this 
outcome is not purely and completely experienced. (PH 60)] 
 
This sense of the irreducible creativity of language leads Humboldt to describe language not 
just as a form of human activity (‘Thätigkeit’), but as an inexplicable form of spontaneous 
activity (‘unerklärliche Selbstthätigkeit’) rather than a product of activity (‘Erzeugnis der 
Thätigkeit’). This inexplicable spontaneous power arouses in Humboldt ‘reverential awe’ 
(‘ehrfurchtsvolle Scheu’) (GS VII: 17) because it manifests the freedom of the individual to 
articulate a unique identity which is always related to, but never reducible to, his or her 
participation in the dialogue of humankind:  
 
Wie sich dies hier abbrechende Daseyn der Einzelnen mit der fortgehenden Entwicklung des 
Geschlechts vielleicht in einer uns unbekannten Region vereinigt, bleibt ein 
undurchdringliches Geheimniss. (GS VII/1: 33) 
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[How this broken-off existence here of the individual is united with the advancing 
development of the species, into a region perhaps unknown to us, remains an impenetrable 
mystery. (PH 38)] 
 
However, this sense of reverence, which Humboldt says is also a necessary moment in the 
education of every person (‘ein wichtiges Moment in der inneren individuellen Ausbildung’) 
is occasioned also by the irreducible plurality of nations and cultures. No particular culture 
can ever become fully self-conscious about the creative power manifest in its particular 
language. Yet the creative interaction of languages and cultures, which can never be wholly 
intelligible at any particular moment of historical time, embodies the cultural development – 
in Humboldt’s terms, the progress (Fortschreiten) – of humankind (GS VII: 17). Humboldt’s 
sense of awe is awakened by the consequences of Babel: the transcendental purpose of the 
diversity of human discourse which is the meaning of difference itself. Language here is the 
paradigm for culture, because the intellectual concentration which the learning of a particular 
language requires also generates consciousness of linguistic exclusivity and thus the need for 
knowledge of a multiplicity of languages to enable universal human discourse. This process 
of learning, like the capacity for mature self-expression to which it gives rise, is necessarily 
unique in every particular individual. Bildung (the self-education of each individual person) 
is the key to understanding Kultur (‘culture’ as it is embodied in the life of human 
communities); not the other way round. Linguistic and cultural difference, because it is the 
living form and not the ossified product of human self-expression (Selbstthätigkeit), can 
never be reduced to the object of either empirical analysis or theoretical reflection. It enjoins, 
in its academic study as much as its immediate expression, an attitude of epistemic respect 
which requires imaginative empathy.  
For this reason, Humboldt argues in his early essay on the historiography of the 
eighteenth century Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert [‘The Eighteenth Century’, 1796–97] that the 
creative writer (der Dichter) will often have more understanding of human character in 
society than the philosophical moralist (der Moralist) (GS II: 74). The true character of a 
language can be shown only by its actual use in human interaction, and this we often 
understand through the literary imagination, especially that of the dramatist who can relate 
dialogue convincingly to action. Only by imagining the use of language in dialogue can we 
understand the connection between its ideal form and its actual expression: a connection 
which is real and actual precisely because it cannot be definitively codified. Our ordinary use 
of language (der Sprachgebrauch) bridges the gap by what Humboldt calls informed and 
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practised feeling (‘das geübte Gefühl’, GS II: 73). It is just such a practical imagination 
which must also inform our reflective and philosophical study of language.
12
 The role of what 
Kant called the productive imagination (‘produktive Einbildungskraft’)13 in the study of 
language reflects, therefore, a fundamental truth about language itself.  
In his essay of 1820 on the comparative study of language, Humboldt argues that all 
language except that of material fact (‘die Ausdrücke für sinnliche Gegenstände’, GS IV: 29 
et seq.) or of the theoretical sciences (‘die Wissenschaften der reinen Gedankenkonstruktion’) 
necessarily involves the whole power of subjective individuality (‘die ganze Kraft der 
subjectiven Individualität’) which encounters the subjectivity of others in dialogue. Linguistic 
usage can broadly be divided into two categories: the scientific (wissenschaftlich) and the 
rhetorical (rednerisch, GS IV: 30 et seq.). The rhetorical use, which constantly employs 
language as a vehicle of the subjective imagination, has the most influence on the character of 
language as a whole, because only the artificial language of science can eliminate all 
subjectivity from linguistic expression to the point of creating a language of objective signs 
(Zeichen). At the same time, the scientific must also be distinguished from the conventional 
use of language (‘der conventionelle Gebrauch der Sprache’) and the language of practical 
affairs (‘der Geschäftsgebrauch’). For the practical and conventional use of language, 
because it is not artificially separated from common life and the free receptivity of language 
to the process of experience (‘die Freiheit der Empfänglichkeit’) which that implies, is always 
affected by the creative and imaginative character of language as well. It is precisely through 
this freedom of receptivity, Humboldt argues, that language develops and the language of a 
people becomes also the language of a national literature (the two, for Humboldt, can never 
ultimately be separated).  
This is the reason for Humboldt’s emphasis on parole (actual linguistic usage) above 
langue (the formal system of linguistic rules) in the Saussurean sense.
14
 For Humboldt, 
language is not Cartesian in Chomsky’s sense, because it does not bring to expression innate 
ideas, whether prompted or not by external stimuli.
15
 Neither is language the product of a 
universal grammar which can be considered present in all human minds prior to its actual 
expression.
16
 To be sure, what Humboldt calls the inner linguistic sense (‘der innere 
Sprachsinn’) is not determined by environment. However, this sense can be real only in 
conjunction with the form of sound which is its actual expression: a conjunction which is 
different in all languages and through which language constantly evolves. It follows that the 
capacity of language to make infinite use of finite means, which is central to Humboldt’s as 
well as Chomsky’s account of language, cannot be understood in Chomsky’s terms as a set of 
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finite but universal rules, innate to the mind, which enable the speaker to produce an infinite 
variety of sentences.
17
 For Humboldt, that infinite capacity develops only through actual 
linguistic practice and the encounter of speakers and languages which that practice entails. 
Langue, for Humboldt, is inseparable from parole. As Roman Jakobson writes, ‘for 
Humboldt, all language is both product and creation, static and dynamic […]. All langue as 
well as parole is […] solidarity with the past, temporal conformity, and infidelity to the past, 
non-conformity.’18 
The irreducible conjunction in human language of individual creativity with objective 
order, which provokes Humboldt’s intellectual reverence, means that despite and indeed 
because of the dialogical character of language, it is always individual people, not national or 
cultural communities, who speak; and it is to individual speakers that we must always listen:  
 
Indem die Sprachen nun also in dem von allem Missverständniss befreiten Sinn des Worts 
Selbstschöpfungen der Nationen sind, bleiben sie doch Selbstschöpfungen der Individuen, 
indem sie sich nur in jedem Einzelnen, in ihm aber nur so erzeugen können, dass jeder das 
Verständnis aller voraussetzt und alle dieser Erwartung genügen. (GS VII: 40) 
 
[So although languages are thus the work of nations, in a sense of the term liberated from all 
misunderstanding, they still remain the self-creations of individuals, in that they can be 
produced solely in each individual, but only in such a fashion that each presupposes the 
understanding of all, and all fulfil this expectation. (PH 44)] 
 
In the same vein, Humboldt remarks that we can equally well speak of a universal language 
of mankind as of a unique presence of language in each and every person:  
 
Denn so wundervoll ist in der Sprache die Individualisirung innerhalb der allgemeinen 
Übereinstimmung, dass man ebenso richtig sagen kann, dass das ganze Menschengeschlecht 
nur eine Sprache, als dass jeder Mensch eine besondere besitzt. (GS VII: 51) 
 
[For in language the individualization within a general conformity is so wonderful, that we 
may say with equal correctness that the whole of mankind has but one language, and that 
every person has one of their own. (PH 43)]  
 
The universal phenomenon of language discloses the meaning of human difference without 
eliding or reducing its reality; and the task of the philosophical linguist is to explain how and 
 12 
why this is so. In this sense Humboldt’s understanding of linguistic difference is very 
different from that of Heidegger, for whom understanding the objectivity of language 
requires a renunciation of subjectivity.
19
  
For this reason, Humboldt’s linguistic thought is central to his ethical and political 
philosophy of human freedom. As Donatella Di Cesare has shown, Humboldt’s idea of 
dialogue is the model for a political community of free individuals which is organically 
whole and not mechanistically organized.
20
 However, Humboldt’s linguistic and political 
vision can be reduced neither to an abstract universalism nor to an ideologically constructed 
idea of Gemeinschaft as a linguistically determined form of community. Humboldt differs 
from the majority of German idealist and romantic thinkers in insisting that the state itself is 
not a human community, but only the necessary means, to be limited as far as possible, of 
enabling such a community to exist.
21
 The idea of an antithesis between the atomized 
individualism of modern society (Gesellschaft) and the immediate or organic community 
(Gemeinschaft), classically formulated by Ferdinand Tönnies in 1888
22
 but disabling to 
generations of German political thinkers,
23
 is entirely foreign to Humboldt. This conceptual 
opposition is irrelevant to Humboldt because, in linguistic communication as in social and 
political interaction, dialogue implies a real acknowledgement of the other, and a real 
understanding of the unique and independent existence of the subject. What Jürgen Trabant 
calls the constitutive strangeness of the linguistic medium reflects the fact that, in the very 
medium of human communication, we encounter the reality of human difference: a ‘Thou’ 
which is not the projection of ourselves, but truly another person.
24
  
This – what might be called the creative alienation implicit in language – is for 
Humboldt the key analogy between the study of language and the study of culture. It is the 
source of a major paradox in Humboldt’s account of language. The science (Wissenschaft) of 
language requires that language should be studied as an objective system. But language can 
never be studied only as an objective system, because our participative subjectivity, as 
students no less than speakers of language, is always involved in the object of our study. For 
this reason Humboldt insists on speaking, not of the science (Wissenschaft) but of the study 
(Studium) of language (GS VII/2: 620–21). For Humboldt, it is this which makes the study of 
language not just a particular humanistic discipline but the epistemic paradigm of both the 
difficulty and the promise of all specifically human knowledge.  
Humboldt’s idea of dialogue is especially relevant to the problem of intercultural 
communication in an age of global civilization. It celebrates more than it reacts against the 
consequences of Babel and so contributes to what Jonathan Sacks has called ‘exorcising 
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Plato’s ghost’.25 Humboldt’s dialogical principle steers a middle course between the Scylla 
and Charybdis of universalism and relativism, because it both affirms the idea of universal 
humanity and eschews any idea of a universal consensus which might be realized in 
abstraction from the resources of linguistic and therefore cultural tradition.  
For Humboldt, dialogue is not the watchword of a culturally freighted and therefore 
outdated European humanism. It is the very opposite. It does justice to both the cultural 
hybridity of the modern world and what Martin Buber called the greatness (Größe) and the 
melancholy (Schwermut) of the human condition. That ambivalence derives from our 
inextricable involvement, because of our capacity for dialogue, in the world of culture. That 
world, because it is human, we can never possess as if it were a thing; yet we must constantly 
strive to make it our own. As Buber writes:  
 
Alle Antwort bindet das Du in die Eswelt ein. Das ist die Schwermut des Menschen, und das 
ist seine Gröβe. Denn so wird Erkenntnis, so wird Werk, so wird Bild und Vorbild in der 
Mitte der Lebendigen.
26
 
 
[Every act of response binds the ‘Thou’ into the world of ‘It’ (‘die Eswelt’). That is the 
melancholy but also the greatness of the human condition. For that is how knowledge, 
creative work, image and example are made manifest amongst living beings.]  
 
That task is unending, because its ultimate object is the truth which is made manifest not in 
spite of or beyond difference, but in and because of it. 
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